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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
George J. Besaw, Jr., appeals from the district court's appellate opinion
affirming Besaw's conviction for DUI with excessive breath alcohol concentration.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A state trooper stopped Besaw's vehicle for failure to signal and for failure
to maintain lane. (R., vol. I, p. 10.) Besaw smelled strongly of alcohol and had
bloodshot eyes. (Id.) The officer administered field sobriety tests, which Besaw
failed. (Id.) Besaw's breath alcohol concentration ("BAC") tested at .219 percent
and .201 percent, with one insufficient sample result. (ld.)
The state charged Besaw with misdemeanor DUI with an excessive (over
.20) breath alcohol concentration.

(R., vol. I, pp. 7-8; 65-66.)

Besaw filed a

"Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine" (hereinafter "Motion"). (R.,
vol. I, pp. 61-63.) In the Motion, Besaw sought to exclude, under the Idaho Rules
of Evidence, all results of field sobriety and BAC tests.

(R., vol. I, pp. 62-63.)

The magistrate court denied the Motion. (R., vol. III, pp. 407-22.)
The matter proceeded to jury trial.

(R., vol. III, pp. 423-26.)

At the

conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty. (R., vol. III, p. 438.)
The magistrate court entered judgment and Besaw appealed to the district court.
(R., vol. III, pp. 439, 446-48.) On appeal, the district court affirmed, specifically
concluding there was no error in the admission at trial of the BAC or field sobriety
testing results.

(R., vol. III, pp. 639-50 (copy attached as appendix).)

1

Besaw

filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's appellate decision. (R., vol.
III, pp. 652-55.)

2

ISSUES
Besaw states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the breath
test [for alleged failure to follow standard operating
procedures].

2.

Whether the trial court erred by not suppressing the field
sobriety test or limiting the use of field sobriety tests by the
State.

3.

Whether the trial court erred in its failure to find a lack of
standards in breath testing as required by the [sic] Idaho
Code § 18-8004(4).

(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Besaw failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision
affirming the magistrate's ruling that the breath testing results were
admissible evidence in Besaw's trial for DUI with an excessive BAC?

2.

Has Besaw failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision
affirming the magistrate's ruling that the field sobriety testing results were
admissible evidence in Besaw's trial for DUI?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Besaw Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of His Breath
Test Results
A.

Introduction
The trial court rejected Besaw's arguments and found the evidence of his

breath alcohol tests admissible at trial.

(R., vol. III, pp. 407-10, 414-21.) The

district court affirmed. (R., vol. III, pp. 639-47.) On appeal to this Court Besaw
claims that the courts below erred on two bases. First, he asserts that the breath
testing instrument required performance verification with the 0.20 alcohol solution
within 24 hours of his test to comply with the standard operating procedures.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-11.) This argument is contrary to the plain language of
those procedures.

Second, he asserts that the officer did not conduct an

adequate observation during the 15-minute observation period prior to testing.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-18.) The record and applicable law, however, show no
error.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."
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kl

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

.lit (citing Losser, 145

Idaho at 670; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981)).
In a DUI prosecution, whether the state has satisfied the foundational
requirements for the admission of breath test results is a question of law over
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451,
452,988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338,339,
882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

Besaw Has Failed To Show That The Lower Courts Erred By Concluding
That His Breath Testing Complied With Applicable Standard Operating
Procedures
In order to have the results of a breath test admitted as evidence at trial,

the state must make a foundational showing that the administrative procedures
which ensure the reliability of the test have been met. State v. Mazzuca, 132
Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127,
129, 867 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Ct. App. 1993)).

To satisfy this foundational

requirement, "the state may rely on I.C. § 18-8004(4), which provides an
expedient method for admitting BAC test results into evidence when the analysis
is conducted pursuant to [Idaho State Police ("ISP")] standards." State v. Uhlry,
121 Idaho 1020, 1022,829 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted).
Specifically, that statute provides:
Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining the
alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho
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state police under the provIsions of approval and certification
standards to be set by that department, or by any other method
approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test for alcohol
concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or
approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method
approved by the Idaho state police shall be admissible in a
proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a
witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for
examination.
I.C. § 18-8004(4). "If the State elects to proceed under § 18-8004(4), it must not
only show that the test equipment was approved by [ISP] but also that the
equipment was operated and the test administered in conformity with [ISP]
standards." State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 411, 973 P.2d 758, 763 (Ct. App.
1999) (citing State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 39-40, 764 P.2d 113, 116-17 (Ct. App.
1988)).
The Standard Operating Procedures ("SOP") promulgated by the Idaho
State Police were admitted into evidence. (Defense Exhibit 3.) "Administrative
rules are interpreted the same way as statutes." Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. Of Tax
Appeals, 150 Idaho 417,420, 247 P.3d 644, 647 (2011).1

The objective of

statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State v. Pina, 149
Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-Hall. Inc., 139
Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative

1 Because Besaw does not link his diatribe about the amendments to the
standard operating procedures to any relevant legal standards (Appellant's brief,
pp. 31-40), the state will respond only by noting that altering the procedures was
a perfectly legitimate exercise where trial courts had given those procedures
unexpected interpretations or where reliable BAC testing was being suppressed
due to minor oversights that did not actually effect the reliability of the testing.
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intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a statute must begin with
the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730,
732 (2009).

Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not

construe it but simply follows the law as written.

McLean v. Maverik Country

Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain
language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable interpretation, it is the
Court's duty to give the statute that interpretation.

Verska v. St. Alphonsus

Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96, 265 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2011)
(disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect to unambiguous
language of statute if such was "palpably absurd").
Application of these standards to the facts of this case shows no error by
the trial or district court.

1.

The Standard Operating Procedures Require Monthly, Not Daily,
Performance Verification With A 0.20 Percent Alcohol Solution

The standard operating procedures require a performance verification
"using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification solution" "within 24 hours, before
or after an evidentiary test." SOP 5.1.3 (Defense Exhibit 3) (emphasis added).
The procedures clarify that a performance verification using the 0.20 solution is
to be done "once per calendar month." SOP 5.1.4. Although it will "satisfy" the
24 hour testing requirement, verification with the 0.20 solution "should not be
used routinely for this purpose." SOP 5.1.4.1. Under the plain language of the
standard operating procedures, the 24 hour performance verifications will
normally use the 0.08 solution and verification using the 0.20 solution is required
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only "once per calendar month," but if the verification using the 0.20 solution was
done within the 24 hour period of a particular test then no additional verification
need be done.

This is the plain language reading of the standard operating

procedures given by both the magistrate (R., vol. III, pp. 417-20) and the district
court (R., vol. III, pp. 642-47).
Besaw argues that the rule of lenity requires the standard operating
procedures to be read as requiring that tests over 0.20 BAC be verified with the
0.20 solution.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11. 2 ) "The rule of lenity requires that

ambiguous criminal statutes should be read narrowly and be construed in favor
of the defendant." State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155, 1159 (Ct.
App. 2011) (citations omitted).

"[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after

considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous
ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as
to what [the legislature] intended." Barber v. Thomas, _

U.S. _ , 130 S.Ct.

2499, 2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The "rule does
not require a court to disregard the purpose of a statute when it is clear from the
context," Jones, 151 Idaho at 947,265 P.3d at 1159, and the mere "grammatical
possibility of a defendant's interpretation does not command a resort to the rule
of lenity if the interpretation proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible
reading of the [legislative] purpose" Abbott v. U.S., _
31 n.9 (2010) (internal quotations omitted).

U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct. 18,

Besaw has failed to show any

Besaw also makes several factual and legal claims refuted by the district court.
(Compare Appellant's brief, pp. 8-11 with R., vol. III, pp. 643-47.) The state
incorporates the district court's analysis of these issues by reference.

2
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ambiguity in the standard operating procedures, much less an ambiguity rising to
the level of requiring application of the rule of lenity.
The standard operating procedures required a performance verification
using the 0.20 solution within the "calendar month" and a verification using either
the 0.08 or the 0.20 solution within 24 hours of Besaw's test. A performance
verification using the 0.20 solution was conducted "just twelve (12) days prior to
Defendant's testing, and a 0.08 performance verification was conducted less
than two (2) hours after Defendant's evidentiary testing was completed." (R., vol.
III, pp. 419-20.)

Besaw has failed to show error in the determination that the

performance verification conducted in his case complied with the standard
operating procedures.

2.

Breath Alcohol Testing Complied With The Requirement Of A 15
Minute Monitoring Period

The standard operating procedures state that a suspect "should be
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes" prior to breath testing.

SOP 6.1.

During this period the suspect "should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or
belch/burp/vomitlregurgitate." Id.

"During the monitoring period, the Operator

must be alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of the breath
alcohol test." SOP 6.1.4. Such events include "the presence of mouth alcohol,"
SOP 6.1.4.1, and vomiting or regurgitating "material from the stomach into the
[suspect's] breath pathway," SOP 6.1.4.1.
The purpose of monitoring for fifteen minutes prior to breath testing is "to
rule out the possibility that alcohol or other substances have been introduced into
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the subject's mouth from the outside or by belching or regurgitation." Bennett v.
State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 144, 206 P.3d 505, 508 (Ct. App. 2009).
The "level of surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to
accomplish that purpose." Wilkinson v. State, Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 784,
787, 264 P.3d 680, 683 (Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). This is not an "onerous burden" and "ordinarily will be met if the officer
stays in close physical proximity to the test subject so that the officer'S senses of
sight, smell and hearing can be employed." Wilkinson, 151 Idaho at 787-88,264
P.3d at 683-84 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bennett, 147 Idaho at 144,
206 P.3d at 508).
The magistrate found that "the officer was within two to three feet of
Defendant Besaw, was facing him at all times, putting himself in a physical
position that allowed him to utilize not only his sight but all his senses to
accomplish the purpose of the monitoring period, which is to determine if a
defendant belches, burps or vomits." (R., vol. III, p. 416.) Both the magistrate
and the district court found this monitoring sufficient to comply with the standard
operating procedures. (R., vol. III, pp. 414-16,646-47.)
Besaw points out that there were several potential distractions during the
monitoring period. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) The mere presence of potential
distractions does not bar a finding that breath test results complied with the
monitoring period. Wilkinson, 151 Idaho at 787-88,264 P.3d at 683-84. Besaw
further argues that "appellate courts have routinely reversed decisions regarding
15 minute observation periods associated with vehicles and being outside."
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(Appellant's brief, p. 18.) He cites two cases, State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451,
988 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1999), and State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 338, 144
P.3d 40,43 (Ct. App. 2006), to support this argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1415.) Two cases in the last thirteen years hardly constitute a "routine." More
importantly, however, neither of these opinions (nor any other) articulated a
different legal standard applicable to "15 minute observation periods associated
with vehicles and being outside." Besaw's claim that there is a different standard
applicable to his case is without merit, and the factual distinctions he points to do
not show error by the magistrate or the district court.
The magistrate and the district court applied the correct legal standards to
the facts and concluded that the officer complied with the fifteen minute
monitoring period required by the standard operating procedures.

Besaw has

failed to show error.

II.
Besaw Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of His Field
Sobriety Test Results
A.

Introduction
The magistrate concluded that evidence of Besaw's performance on field

sobriety tests was admissible.
affirmed on intermediate appeal.
courts below erred.

(R., vol. III, pp. 410-14.)

The district court

(R., vol. III, pp. 647-49.)

Besaw claims the

Specifically, he first asserts that the state must establish

compliance with NHTSA standards as a prerequisite to admissibility. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 18-20.) He next argues that field sobriety tests are not scientifically
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reliable.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 21-31.) Neither of these arguments has merit

because they are contrary to established precedent.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

Js:L

The admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary and will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Crea,
119 Idaho 352,806 P.2d 445 (1991); State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29,909 P.2d
647 (Ct. App. 1996).

Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other

questions of admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v.
Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630,632,945 P.2d 1,3 (1997); State v. MacDonald, 131
Idaho 367,956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Applicable Idaho Law Allows A Police Officer To Testify Regarding Field
Sobriety Tests
Rule 702 of the Idaho rules of Evidence provides: "If scientific, technical,

or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
12

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." "To be admissible, the expert's testimony must
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75,81,175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted);
see also I.R.E. 702.

"The function of the expert is to provide testimony on

subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience and education of the
average juror." State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App.
1998) (citations omitted).

"An 'expert' in a court proceeding is someone

possessing skill or knowledge beyond the competency of the average juror.
Formal training or an advanced degree is not essential to qualify a witness as an
expert, but practical experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a
witness within the category of 'expert.'" State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 330, 127
P.3d 231, 234 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
Idaho law provides that a properly trained police officer may testify
regarding field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. State
v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 824-25, 892 P.2d 889, 891-92 (1995); State v.
Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65-66, 844 P.2d 691, 694-95 (1992); State v. Garrett,
119 Idaho 878, 880-83, 811 P.3d 488, 490-93 (1991); State v. Anderson, 130
Idaho 765, 767-68, 947 P.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Ct. App. 1997); see also State v.
Corwin, 147 Idaho 893, 896-97, 216 P.3d 651, 654-55 (Ct. App. 2009); Burrow,
142 Idaho at 330-31, 127 P.3d at 234-35; State v. Charan, 132 Idaho 341,343,
971 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. McCurdy, 100 Idaho 683, 686, 603
P.2d 1017, 1020 (1979).

Because it is well established that the evidence in
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question is admissible, Besaw has failed to show error by the magistrate or
district courts.
Besaw argues that this precedent should be rejected in favor of the
dissenting opinion in Garrett, 119 Idaho at 883-85, 811 P.3d at 493-95 (Johnson,
J., dissenting), which would have required some degree of medical expertise to
associate nystagmus with being under the influence of alcohol.

(Appellant's

brief, pp. 25-26.) Besaw then advocates application of such a standard to all
field sobriety tests. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-29.) He further contends that this
Court should adopt the NHTSA standards for performing field sobriety tests as a
minimum standard for admission of evidence of the results of those tests.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 29-31.)

Adopting Besaw's suggested legal tests would

necessarily involve overruling the contrary precedent cited above.

Besaw has

failed to show that this precedent "is manifestly wrong," has been "proven over
time to be unjust or unwise," or that "overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice," and has therefore
failed to show that overruling it would be proper. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9,
43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652,
655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803
P.2d 978, 983 (1990)).
Because adoption of the legal standards advocated by Besaw would
necessarily require overruling existing precedent on the subject, and because
Besaw has failed to show that such precedents should be overruled, Besaw has
failed to show that the magistrate or district court erred by following well

14

established precedent and ruling that the arresting officer could testify regarding
field sobriety tests he conducted.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the appellate decision
of the district court affirming the rulings of the trial court.

DATED this 13th day of Novemb ,2012.
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Attorney at Law
PO Drawer 285
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Deputy Attorney Genetal
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

v.
GEORGE J. BESAW, JR.,
Defendant.
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)
)
)
)
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)
)

CASE NO. CRll-004l9
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER ON APPEAL

Tills matter is before the Court on Defendant's appeal of the magistrate court's ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine. The Court heard oral
arguments on this matter on March 8, 2012. Plaintiff State of Idaho was represented by Nez
Perce County deputy prosecutor Justin J. Coleman. Defendant George J. Besaw was represented
by attorney Charles M. Stroschein. The Court, having reviewed the record in the matter, having
read the transcript of the hearing in the magistrate court and the briefs of the parties, having
heard the oral arguments of Counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its
decision.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Besaw was stopped by Idaho State Patrol Trooper Jeffory Talbott in the early
morning hours of January 16,2011, after Trooper Talbott observed the Defendant fail to signal
and fail to maintain his lane of travel while traveling on 21 st Street in Lewiston, Idaho. As
Trooper Talbott talked to Besaw, he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from
the vehicle and observed Besaw's eyes were bloodshot. After running a driver's check, Trooper
Talbott asked Besaw to perform field sobriety evaluations. Besaw agreed and got out of his
vehicle. Trooper Talbott checked Besaw's eyes for horizontal gaze nystagmus and had Besaw
perform a one-leg stand evaluation and a walk-and-turn evaluation.
Based on his observations, Trooper Talbott formed the opinion Besaw was under the
influence of alcohoL The trooper placed Besaw under arrest and, after handcuffing him, placed
him in the back of his patrol vehicle leaving the door open. Trooper Talbott leaned against his

patrol vehicle next to Besaw and, facing the Defendant, read him the advisory form and observe
him for IS-minutes before having him provide breath samples for testing. As Trooper Talbott

observed Besaw, he programmed the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. During the 15minute observation period, Trooper Talbott was contacted by a Lewiston City Police officer and
a brief conversation ensued. Trooper Talbott's attention was also briefly directed toward a
passenger in Besaw's vehicle and to an individual who arrived to transport one of Besaw's
passengers.
After the IS-minute observation period, Trooper Talbott had Besaw submit three (3)
breath samples into the Lifeloc-FC20 instrument. The instrument tested Besaw's blood alcohol
content and reported results of 0.219 and 0.201, with a third breath sample testing as insufficient.

2
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Based on the results of the breath tests, Trooper Talbott informed Besaw he was under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol and Besaw was transported to the Nez Perce County jail.
On February 4,2011, counsel for Besaw filed a Notice Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules
of Evidence Rule 803(24) that included a number of attachments. On February 15,2011,
Besaw's counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss andJor Suppress andJor in Limine. A hearing on the
Motion was held on May 6, 2011, during which Trooper Talbott was called to testify. The
magistrate court also had a large number of documents before it that had been submitted by the
Defendant. After the parties were given the opportunity to submit post hearing briefs, the
magistrate court entered its ruling on July 28, 2011 denying Defendant Besaw's Motion. The
matter then went to jury trial and, on September 8, 2011, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of

Dill.
On November 2,2011, Defendant Besaw filed a Notice of Appeal. The Defendant listed
the following issues to be addressed on appeal: (1) whether the magistrate court abused its
discretion by not suppressing the breath test results; (2) whether the magistrate court abused its
discretion by admitting into evidence the field sobriety tests or by failing to limit the use of the .
tests by the State; (3) whether the magistrate court abused its discretion when it failed to fmd a
lack of standards in breath testing as required by I.C. § 18-8004(4).

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
On appeal of a trial court's admission of evidence, the trial court will be reversed only
upon a showing the court abused its discretion. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-74,
829 P.2d 861, 863-64(1992). Upon an assertion that the trial court abused its discretion, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court
3
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correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

On appeal, the magistrate's record is examined to determine whether there was
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law correctly flowed from those findings. State v. Stump, 146 Idaho
857, 859, 203 P .3d 1256 (Ct.App.2009).

ANALYSIS

(A) DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS BREATH TESTS
On appeal, Defendant contends the arresting officer failed to comply with the
performance verification requirements for the Lifeloc-FC20 as set out in the standard operating
procedures manual and that the officer failed to properly conduct the fifteen (15) minute
observation period prior to conducting BAC breath testing. The magistrate court disagreed with
the Defendant's position and denied his motion to suppress the breath test evidence.
Idaho Code § 18-8004 provides in relevant part:
For purposes oftbis chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be
based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven
(67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of
determining the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police
under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by that
department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police.
Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw or rule of court, the results of any test
for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by
the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police
4

State v. Besaw
Opinion & Order on Appeal

64.2

:::fFt
\

shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for
examination.

I.e. § 18-8004(4).
Evidentiary testing of blood, urine or breath done to determine the alcohol concentration
of a driver is admissible in a judicial proceeding without the need for expert testimony so long as
the testing was done in compliance with any method approved by the Idaho State Police. In the
instant matter, Defendant Besaw contends Trooper Talbott failed to comply with the standard
operating procedures ("SOP") promulgated by the Idaho State Police relevant to performance
verification requirements for the Lifeloc-FC20. The Defendant contends the SOP requires a
performance verification utilizing the 0.20 solution within 24 hours of any test with results of
0.20 or higher. In the instant matter, Defendant Besaw's breath test results indicated he had a
blood alcohol content ("BAC") of 0.219 and 0.206. However, the performance verification that
was conducted within 24 hours of his testing was done utilizing a 0.08 solution. The State does
not dispute the results of Defendant Besaw's breath tests nor does it dispute that a 0.08 solution
was utilized for the performance verification done within 24 hours before or after Defendant
Besaw's test. Rather, the State contends the SOP only requires a 0.20 performance verification
once per calendar month, regardless of test results.
The Standard Operating Procedures manual in effect at the time of Defendant Besaw's
arrest addr€sses performance verifications on the Lifeloc-FC20 at section 5 of the manual and
reads:]

5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments

IDefendant's Exhibit #3, admitted at the May 6, 2011 Motion Hearing held by the magistrate court
5
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Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing
inst:nunent is functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed
using a wet bath simulator performance verification solution. The solution is
provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the
target value and acceptable range of the solutions used for the verification and
includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of Analysis for each solution.
Note: The ISPFS established target values may be different from those shown
on the bottle label.
5.1

Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument
Performance Verification

5.1.1

The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS.

5.1.2

The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance
verification solutions consist of two samples.

5.1.3

A performance verification of the Aleo-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20
instruments using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification solution must be
performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered
by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on
the use of the 0.20 solution in this capacity.
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with
fresh solution approximately every 25 verifications or every
calendar month, whichever comes first.

5.1.4

A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25
verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first

NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was implemented for
. the sole purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 188004C charge. Failure to timely perform a 0.20 performance
verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at
other levels or in charges other than 18-8004C.
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an
evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification
solution should not be used routinely for this purpose.
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The Lifeloc-FC20 performance verification portion of the SOP contains no language that
supports Defendant's asserted position. The SOP recommends a performance verification using
the 0.20 solution be performed once per calendar month and notes that the 0.20 performance
verification was implemented to support the instruments results when a test result shows a BAC
of 0.20 or greater in violation of I.C. § 18-8004C.2 While the SOP requires a performance
verification be run within 24 hours of any test, it makes clear the 0.20 verification should not be
used for this routine performance verification, i.e. the 24 hour requirement However, when the
0.20 verification is performed in order to meet the "per calendar month" requirement, any test
results obtained during the 24 hours before or after the monthly 0.20 performance verification
will meet the requirements for evidentiary use. The SOP notes that failure to timely perform a
0.20 performance verification, i.e. to perform a 0.20 verification once per calendar month, may
invalidate test results of 0.20 or greater, but will not invalidate test results below 0.20. Nothing
in the notation suggests that in order for a test result of 0.20 or greater to be valid, a 0.20
performance verification must be run within 24 hours before or after the test, as asserted by
Defendant
Finally, the Defendant argued to the Court that the purpose of the performance
verification is to verify a test result is accurate, not to verify that the testing instrument is
functioning correctly. Defendant's argument runs contrary to the statement of purpose that
precedes the performance verlfication procedures. The SOP clearly states, "Performance
verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho State Police Forensic
Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is functioning correctly."

Defendant does not dispute that a 0.20 performance verification was conducted once per calendar month during the
time in question.

2
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The court finds the SOP's are clear and unambiguous regarding the performance
verifications to be run on the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. 3 A performance
verification must be run within 24 hours before or after an evidentiary test, preferably utilizing
the 0.08 solution. A performance verification using the 0.20 solution should be run once every
calendar month and, when conducted, can also be used to meet the 24 hour requirement,
eliminating the need to duplicate the performance verification with a 0.08 solution. The
magistrate court found the proper procedures had been followed in regard to performance
verifications. This Court agrees with the findings of the magistrate court.
Defendant next contends the breath test results should have been suppressed, as the
arresting officer did not properly conduct the fifteen minute observation period prior to breath
testing. The magistrate court, after reviewing the video from the officer's dashboard camera,
found the officer was at all times within two to three feet of Besaw, putting himself in a physical
position that allowed him to utilize not only his sense of sight, but all his senses to accomplish
the goal of the monitoring period. The trial court further found the officer's attention was not
impeded to such a degree that his various senses were diverted from the Defendant. After
viewing the video, this Court agrees.
During the fifteen minute observation period, the officer at all times stayed within two to
three feet of the Defendant and in a position where he was able to use his sense of sight, hearing,
and smelL He at all times remained focused on the Defendant, engaged in conversation with
3 Defendant in his briefing argues that the definition of calibration in the Lifeloc Reference Manual, found as
Defendant's Exhibit 2 and admitted into evidence at the May 6, 2011 motion hearing, makes the logged dates of the
most recent 0.20 performance verification "suspect". The Court finds no "suspect" language in the manual
definition, but rather finds Defendant fails to distinguish between a password sensitive calibration that must be done
in the lab and a performance verification which checks the accuracy of the instrument by running a test against a
known sample. Defendant further argues that the procedural differences for breath tests done relative to a minor in
possession/consumption investigation versus a DUI investigation makes the standards suspect. The Court declines
Defendant's invitation to imply suspect motives to differences in procedure, as any differences are irrelevant to the
instant matter as it does not involve a charge of minor in possession/consumption.
8
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him, and the officer averted efforts by others to garner his attention. The Court in State v.
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 882 P.2d 993 (Ct.App.1994) and in State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho
335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct.App.2006), held that an officer need not stare fixedly at a driver during the
fifteen minute observation period, but may utilize all ofms senses to observe the driver to assure
he does not burp, belch or vomit prior to performing breath testing. "So long as the officer is
continually in position to use all ofms senses, not just sight, to determine that the defendant did
not belch, burp or vomit during the observation period, the observation complies with the
training manual instructions." State v. Stump, 146 Idaho 857, 860,203 P.3d 1256
(Ct.App.2009).

In the instant matter, the officer clearly remained focused on Defendant Besaw at all
times and was in sufficient proximity to be able to use all his senses to assure no event occurred
that might skew the test results. The Court fInds the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the breath test, as there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the trial court's fInding that as a matter oflaw, the officer complied with the
requirements of the SOP by properly and timely performing performance verifications on the
Lifeloc-FC20 and in conducting the fIfteen minute observation period.
CB) FIELD SOBRlETY TESTS
Defendant contends the magistrate court erred in allowing the officer to testify regarding
the field sobriety tests ("FST") performed by the Defendant. In particular, the Defendant
contends there was insufficient foundation laid, the FST's were irrelevant, and their probative
value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, rather than provide the Court

with facts and legal support relative to three grounds stated, the Defendant has chosen to
challenge the reliability of the science behind fIeld sobriety testing, in particular the HGN test.
9
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The issue of whether field sobriety tests are admissible as evidence at trial has been
addressed on numerous occasions by Idaho's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. The most
challenged of the FST's is the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, or HGN. While it is the law in
Idaho that field sobriety tests are not admissible to show a degree or level of intoxication, it has
long been established in Idaho that the tests may be admitted as indicators of possible
intoxication for purposes of establishing probable cause to arrest. Idaho's Supreme Court long
ago ruled the tests scientifically sound and ruled them admissible through the testimony of a law
enforcement officer who has been trained in conducting and evaluating the tests. See State v.

Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991) and State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62,844 P.2d 691
(1992). The trial court correctly analyzed the admissibility ofFST's and recognized the limits to
be placed on testimony regarding FST's.4
Finally, Defendant's contention that the trial court was required to conduct a Rule 702
hearing to determine the scientific reliability ofFST's is without support in the law. Rule 702 of
the Idaho Rules of Evidence reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto

in the form of an opinion or otherwise." As long as a proper foundation is laid establishing an
officer as an expert on the subject of FST' s based on his knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, the court may allow such evidence to be presented to the jury if it is determined such
evidence will assist the trier-of-fact. The Court finds the trial court made a reasoned analysis

4 In briefing, the Defendant takes issue with the trial court's failure to address the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration standards regarding field sobriety tests. The Court finds no error on the part of the trial court for not
addressing standards that are without legal effect in IdahQ other than as they have been incorporated into Idaho case
law, statutes, rules, and regulations. The admissibility question in regard to field sobriety tests has been resolved by
Idaho's Appellate Courts, making analysis under NHTSA standards unnecessary and irrelevant.
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regarding FST's and correctly determined they were admissible within the limitations established
by Idaho's Appellate Courts.
(C) TIlE IDAHO STATE POLICE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL

The Defendant contends the most recent revision of the SOP manual should be found by
the Court to violate the duties given to the Idaho State Police ("ISP") in I.e. § 18-8004, wherein
ISP is charged with the duty of promulgating standards for the administration of breath alcohol
testing. The Defendant raised this issue with the trial court and now argues the court abused its
discretion by failing to find the SOP revision resulted in there being essentially no standards as
required by Idaho Code. This Court, however, concurs with the magistrate coUrt's ruling.
The Defendant contends the revisions by Idaho State Police Forensic Services were not
based on science, but on finding ways to eliminate challenges in court. The Defendant's
argument relies primarily, if not solely, on interdepartmental email exchanges relative to revising
the SOP manual. While the Court is sensitive to Defendant's concern that certain procedural
standards were revised by eliminating mandatory language such as 'must', and replacing it with
non-mandatory language such as 'should', the Court is unable to find such changes problematic
without evidence that it reduces the scientific reliability of test results.
Like all technology, breath testing is ever evolving and hopefully improving. While the
trial court and this Court have been presented with no evidence that the revisions are the result of
improved technology, neither has any evidence been presented indicating the changes reduce the
reliability oftest results obtained with the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. The role of
the courts is not to dictate to ISP how they are to fulfill their statutory duties, nor has the
Defendant presented any authority that would allow the Court to do so. For this Court to say
there are no standards merely because revisions have been made to some, but not all, portions of
J1
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the SOP manual, without evidence that the changes negatively affect test results, would work an
absurdity. Therefore, the Court declines the invitation to second guess Idaho State Police
Forensic Services.

ORDER
The ruling of the magistrate court denying Defendant Besaw's Motion to Dismiss and/or
Suppress and/or in Limine is hereby AFFIRMED.

Dated this
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I hereby certifY that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER was:
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~

_ _ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this
2012, to:

5 ia;r of April,

Justin J. Coleman
Deputy Prosecutor
Nez Perce County
PO Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501

Charles M. Stroschein
PO Box 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

State v. Besaw

13

Opinion & Order on Appeal

651

